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Audit Market Structure, Fees and Choice in a Period of 
Structural Change:  Evidence from the UK – 1998-2003 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in 
the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998-
2003).  Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the 
individual audit firm level and by industry sector.  There is evidence of significant 
upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees.  Audit fee 
income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of 
auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients.  A 
decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the 
period identifies the impact of four distinct consumer-based reasons for change: 
leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; and (only for the audit fees measure) 
audit fee changes.  Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality 
among the top tier firms but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On 
switching to the new auditor, former Andersen clients experienced an initial audit fee 
rise broadly in line with inflation, with no evidence of fee premia or discounting.  
They also reported significantly lower NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and 
auditees responding to public concerns about perceptions of auditor independence.  
There is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of 
the audit fee by NAS.  The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that 
recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concerns 
remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the governance and 
accountability of audit firms.  
 
Key words: Arthur Andersen; audit market; audit fees; concentration; Big 4; industry 
specialism; competition; low-balling. 
 
Audit Market Structure, Fees and Choice in a Period of 
Structural Change:  Evidence from the UK – 1998-2003 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rising audit market concentration has attracted the interest of regulators, market 
participants and academics for many years, especially since the audit firm mega-
mergers of the 1980s and 1990s which reduced the global Big 8 to the Big 5.  During 
that period, there was a general concern (based on the predictions of classical micro-
economic theory) that excessive concentration would reduce competition, leading to 
an increase in the price of the services provided by the auditor (Financial Times, 
1997).  Paradoxically, there was also concern, based on observed market behaviour, 
regarding excessive competition and low-balling (e.g. CAJEC, 1992).  From an 
industrial economics viewpoint, high seller concentration can both harm consumers 
and also benefit them through, for example, economies of scale and scope.  Although 
concerns about the so-called ‘mega-mergers’ on competition were raised, in general 
the regulatory conclusion was that the mergers would be unlikely to substantially 
lessen competition (Goddard, 1998; Thavapalan et al., 2002).   
A further major shock to the system of financial reporting and auditing arose when the 
US energy giant, Enron, failed in 2001.  This event, along with other financial 
scandals in the US, led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which 
instituted reforms designed to restore confidence in corporate governance.  Given the 
global nature of capital markets and further scandals in Europe (e.g. Parmalat), there 
have been moves to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley style reforms throughout Europe and 
elsewhere (Oxley, 2007; Quick et al., 2007).  In June 2002, Andersen, one of the top 
five audit firms in the world, was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding 
documents related to Enron.1 As a result, the firm lost its auditing license in the US.2  
In August 2002, the firm ceased business and, in the UK, was acquired by Deloitte & 
Touche, reducing the number of big accounting firms from five to four. In the US, the 
Andersen business was dissolved and former Andersen clients switched to other, 
mainly Big 4, audit firms. This event sparked further intense debate, which is 
ongoing, about competition and audit quality in the audit market (e.g., EC, 2002, 
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2008; OFT, 2002; GAO, 2003; Oxera, 2006, 2007; FRC, 2006a, b, c; FRC 2007a, b; 
FRC 2009; US Treasury, 2008) and provides motivation for the present study. 
 
Immediately following Andersen’s demise, in the US the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) studied the effect of consolidation but found no evidence of impaired 
competition (GAO, 2003).  Prior to Andersen’s acquisition, the EC also examined the 
possible impact of the acquisition, concluding that there was no danger of the creation 
of a single dominant firm since Andersen and Deloitte were the smallest of the Big 5 
firms (EC, 2002).  More recently, the GAO has updated its report on audit market 
concentration, concluding that, in 2006, the Big 4 continue to dominate the large 
company market segment while concentration has eased in the small and mid 
company market segments (GAO, 2008).  Additionally, the US Treasury received a 
final report from the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (2008), a body 
set up by the US Treasury in 2007.  One of the principal topics considered by the 
committee is audit market competition and concentration (the others being human 
capital and firm structures and finances).  The report makes six recommendations in 
relation to this topic, including the reduction of barriers to entry for small auditing 
firms.3   
 
In the UK, a report on competition and choice in the UK audit market was 
commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and Industry/Financial Reporting 
Council (Oxera, 2006).4  This was followed by discussion papers on choice in the UK 
audit market and promoting audit quality (FRC, 2006a, b; 2007c) and by reports on 
choice (FRC, 2007a, b; 2009).  Stakeholders expressed a strong preference for 
market-led solutions to the problem of restricted choice in the market for audit 
services to public interest entities in the UK and proposed a package of 15 
recommendations designed to lessen concentration over the medium term.  These 
recommendations require action by all market participants including audit firms, 
investors, companies, regulators and legislators.5   
Academics have also investigated the impact of Andersen’s dissolution on 
concentration, with Beattie et al. (2003) predicting that the acquisition would increase 
the Big 4’s UK listed clientele to 72.8% of all audit clients (96.3% in terms of audit 
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fees).  In terms of individual firm market share, it was projected that Deloitte would 
become the third largest audit firm in the UK, accounting for 19.2 % of the total 
market (based on audit fees).  
However, as the EC and Beattie et al. (2003) studies were based on pro-forma figures, 
there is no published study that documents the actual impact of Andersen’s 
dissolution in the UK. Further, since these studies cover only a very short period of 
time, the extent of change in concentration in the UK listed company audit market in 
recent years is not yet fully documented.  This is especially true for the period 
following the Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger in 1998.  To our 
knowledge, the only UK study that offers a detailed investigation of audit market 
concentration among the entire population of listed companies during the 2000s is 
Beattie et al. (2003).  Previously, studies undertaken by Briston and Kedslie (1985), 
Moizer and Turley (1987, 1989), Beattie and Fearnley (1994), Peel (1997),6 and Pong 
(1999) jointly cover the period from 1972 to 1995.7  The study by Pong and Burnett 
(2006) examines the years 1997 and 2001.  Figures reported in recent studies 
commissioned or produced by regulators (Oxera, 2006; POB, 2006, 2007, 2008; FRC, 
2007b) offer limited insights into the structure of the market, due to restricted samples 
or the use of measures based on only number of audits.  Recent academic studies are 
also based on restricted samples: McMeeking (2007) reports on the FRSE 100 while 
McMeeking et al. (2007) report on 309 listed companies in 2002. 
The present study seeks to provide answers to the following specific research 
questions with respect to the UK domestic listed company audit market during the 
crucial period of structural change 1998-2003: 
1. Have audit fee rates changed significantly during the period? 
2. What was the aggregate level of audit market concentration following the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ merger and immediately following Andersen’s 
demise (i.e., 1998 to 2003) and did it change significantly? 
3. What market shares did individual firms hold during this period and to what 
extent are the larger mid-tier firms in a position to compete in the listed 
company market? 
4. What is the relative importance of joiners, leavers and switchers in explaining 
the overall change in aggregate audit market concentration?  
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5. Immediately following Andersen’s demise, who dominated the market at 
industry level? 
6. Who audits former Andersen clients and did their audit and/or non-audit 
services (NAS) fees change significantly in the short-term? 
 
The specific contributions of the paper are fourfold.  First, it provides a discussion of 
both the traditional and contemporary theory of industrial economics and its 
limitations in relation to making predictions about real markets (and the audit market 
in particular.)  Second, it presents a descriptive analysis of the structure of the entire 
population of the listed company market (where existing studies cover only restricted 
samples) and at a detailed level (industry sector and individual firm) for a crucial 
period of structural change.  Third, it offers insights into the complex dynamics 
underlying observed changes in market structure by undertaking a decomposition 
analysis.  Fourth, it contributes to the growing, and conflicting, Andersen-related 
literature by (i) analysing the short-term impact of this event in the UK, where no 
study has yet been published; (ii) documenting the impact on market structure; (iii) 
analysing the fee impact of the Andersen dissolution, controlling for company size; 
and (iv) evaluating the possible impact of NAS fee cross-subsidisation on audit fees. 
 
Due to the global nature of many large companies, the capital markets and the audit 
firm networks, the characteristics of the UK listed company audit market are shared 
with many other markets worldwide (FRC, 2006a: 8).  Thus, the findings and 
conclusions from the present study have potential relevance in the global setting.  
Notwithstanding this, however, national markets do have specific characteristics and 
features.  For example, the manner of the Andersen dissolution varied across countries 
– in the UK most clients transferred to Deloitte & Touche, in Australia most 
transferred to Ernst and Young and in the US the spread was fairly wide.  In the UK, 
Deloitte & Touche (thereafter to be known as Deloitte) offered partnership or 
employment to 260 Andersen UK partners and around 3,500 UK employees. 
Andersen’s associate law firms were not involved in the agreement and Andersen’s 
insolvency/corporate restructuring division decided not to join Deloitte & Touche 
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(EC, 2002).  Andersen partners are reported to have voted ‘overwhelmingly’ in favour 
of the acquisition8; so it is likely that most audit partners did remain with Deloitte, at 
least in the short-term. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  The next section provides a brief 
overview of the economic theory on market structure and behaviour, before 
considering the unique features of the audit market setting and discussing the factors 
that lead to changes in market concentration.  This literature section goes on to review 
prior empirical studies of audit market concentration, the consequences of market 
concentration and the impact of Andersen’s demise on audit pricing.  Section 3 
outlines the methods used to measure audit market concentration, data sources and 
data collection methods.  Section 4 presents the results and discussion.  Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
2.1 Industrial economics: traditional and contemporary theory 
From the 1940s until the 1970s, the study of industrial organisation centred on the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, which posits that there is a direct 
link from structure, to conduct, to performance.  The implication is that the more 
concentrated an industry, the more market power9 the organisation exercises and thus 
the larger the deviation from competitive pricing.  This view resulted in aggressive 
antitrust policy in the US and Europe (Pepall et al., 2008). 
Over time, it was realised that increased concentration, when combined with cost 
efficiencies, does not necessarily lead to higher prices.  In equilibrium, both 
concentration and performance are endogenously determined by underlying cost and 
demand parameters (Beattie et al., 2003).  Thus, more efficient firms should grow 
faster than less efficient firms resulting in a more concentrated industry structure.   
In the 1970s, researchers’ focus shifted from the study of market structure (S) and 
performance (P) to the study of conduct (C) (i.e., strategic behaviour).  It was 
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gradually realised that the decisions made by firms regarding pricing, nature of 
product/service, expansion and investment feed back to affect structure.  Strategic 
interaction was modelled using (non-cooperative) game theory, giving rise to the ‘new 
industrial organisation’ theory of the 1980s and which continues to the present.  It was 
shown that it is difficult to construct an economic model in which there are significant 
merger gains due to cost efficiencies – this is the ‘merger paradox’.  As a consequence 
of these theoretical ambiguities, competition regulation must also rely on empirical 
analysis to predict ex ante and observe ex post the effects of changes in market 
structure (Pepall et al., 2008, ch. 16).   
2.2 The audit market setting 
The applicability of industrial organisational theory to the audit market is reviewed by 
Yardley et al. (1992) and Beattie and Fearnley (1994).  The unique characteristics of 
the audit market include: inelastic demand due to statutory requirement for audit; 
regulated activity; the unobservability of quality or audit costs; and the possibility of 
cross-subsidisation of audit fees arising from the provision of non-audit services 
(NAS) and knowledge spillovers (Stein, 2006)).  Consequently, the determinants and 
consequences of concentration are especially difficult to assess using theoretical 
analysis and, therefore, must be investigated empirically.  As audit firm costs are 
unobservable, audit fees (revenues rather than profits) must generally be used to proxy 
for profits.   
Key general influences on the audit market are economic, political and regulatory in 
nature:  stage in the economic cycle, shocks caused by financial scandals such as 
Enron and regulatory intervention into the audit market (e.g. corporate governance 
codes; US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).  The demand from company managers, 
company board and shareholders for low cost versus high quality audits varies over 
time.  The actual level of concentration and competition (both price and quality) is the 
result of complex interactions between these general influences, mediated by specific 
company and audit firm factors.  The scandal associated with Andersen’s demise gave 
rise to a unique merger situation in which the demand for monitoring, which is costly, 
increased.  However, to set against this, the selection of an audit firm requiring a new 
audit team incurs costly switching costs.   
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Given the audit firm’s demise, companies were forced to change from Andersen 
acting as both auditor and as the firm providing the consultancy reflected in the NAS 
reported in the financial statements.  They could choose whether to use the newly 
appointed auditor (resulting in reported NAS) or a different firm to provide NAS (and 
zero reported NAS).  Given the political pressure to avoid potential conflict of 
interests in joint provision, the reported NAS might be expected to fall to reduce the 
perceived (or real) threat to auditor independence.  Alternatively, knowledge 
spillovers and/or the new auditor’s desire for increased fees and profit via cross-
subsidisation of the audit fee might lead to increased reported NAS.  
 
2.3 Sources of change in market concentration 
There are three principal sources of change in concentration: change in the set of 
consumers; change in the set of providers; and realignments (switches).  Change in 
the set of consumers results from companies entering or exiting the market through 
initial public offerings, mergers, insolvencies, delisting, re-admission and temporary 
suspension (Beattie et al., 2003).   
Change in the set of suppliers arises from audit firm merger or demise and new 
entrants.  Mergers and acquisitions enable audit firms to expand their business to 
achieve greater economies of scale and also industry-specific expertise (GAO, 2003).  
Gramling and Stone (2001) note that auditor specialisation has become both a 
minimum requirement and a barrier to entry in the audit service market, due to 
professional standards and emergent risk-based audit technologies that require 
industry expertise to be integrated into their audit approaches.  Other barriers to entry 
are high capital requirements, lack of recommendation by capital market participants, 
high litigation risk and insurance costs, the need for international coverage, and 
international management structures, particularly in the case of the audit market for 
public listed companies (GAO, 2003; Oxera, 2007),.10, 11  The demise or merger of 
large audit firms, though very rare, is also popularly thought to increase market 
concentration.  Interestingly, however, neither Comunale and Sexton (2003) nor 
Duxbury et al. (2007) produce this result using Markov chain modelling in relation to 
the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger.  Further, based on EU data, Ballas (2005) did 
not find that concentration increased following Andersen’s demise. 
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Voluntary realignments are said to occur where companies initiate the auditor change; 
in the UK and many other countries this requires shareholders’ approval.12  If there is 
an underlying preference for the leading suppliers (currently the Big 4 firms), then 
these realignments, provided that other factors remain equal, will result in rising 
concentration (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Beattie et al., 2003).  Audit firm 
resignations are uncommon and signal forced change for the client company.13  
However, the political climate is believed to have caused some audit firms (especially 
the Big 4) to reassess the risk profile of their client portfolio and not seek 
reappointment in the case of ‘risky’ clients (Coffee, 2006, p.166).14   
2.4 Empirical studies of concentration in the UK listed company audit market 
The number of audit firms active in the market has been used as an indicator of 
market structure.  The two concentration measures reported in prior studies are the k-
firm concentration ratio (CR) and, less commonly, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
(HI).  These measures are based on either number of audits or audit fees.  Table 1 
summarises the findings from 15 prior academic and professional studies on 
concentration in the UK market, covering the 35 year period 1972-2007.  By 
organising the findings according to time and measure, the trend over time is revealed.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Column 3 of Table 1 show that great care must be taken when comparing the findings 
from different studies and what is included in the definition of listed companies can 
vary greatly.  In several studies (Moizer and Turley, 1987, 1989; McMeeking 2007), 
only the largest companies are included, while in another (Oxera, 2006) there is a bias 
towards the largest companies.  Some studies include only a sample of companies 
(McMeeking et al., 2007) while others exclude Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
companies, which are generally smaller than main market companies.  The number of 
companies on the main market has been declining steadily for 10 years, while the 
number of AIM companies has been rising at a much faster rate.  For this reason, it is 
increasingly important that studies include this sector of the listed company market to 
avoid the upward distortion of the large-company focus on concentration measures 
based only on the main market.  Finally, two studies (Pong, 1999; Pong and Burnett, 
2006) exclude investment trusts, although this will have no systematic effect provided 
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that they have a similar size distribution to the other companies included in the 
sample.15  These choices greatly affect the number of companies included in the ‘UK 
listed’ sample (see column 4 of Table 1). 
Notwithstanding these sampling differences, the general trend over time is one of 
increasing concentration.  In discussing this trend, results from Moizer and Turley 
(1987, 1989) (rows 1 and 2) and FRC (2007b) (final row) have been ignored due to 
the restricted samples used.  The number of active audit firms has fallen from 362 in 
1984 to 85 in 2002 (the figure of 66 for 2001 reported by Pong and Burnett (2006) can 
perhaps be attributed to their exclusion of some listed companies).16  The four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4), based on number of audits, has risen from 0.38 in 1984 to 
0.83 in 2006. Evidence based on the more informative audit fee measure is more 
limited, but the trend is from 0.77 in 1991 to between 0.93 and 0.97 in 2003/5 
(depending on the sample used).  Measures of the Herfindahl index based on audit 
fees indicate a significant increase in concentration (15.9 in 1992 rising to 24.8 in 
2001). 
Few studies report a comprehensive set of concentration indicators, and the most 
recent studies to offer a reasonably full picture are Pong (1999) for 1995 and Pong 
and Burnett (2006) for 1997 and 2001.  In particular, the recent official studies (the 
Oxera Report commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and Industry/Financial 
Reporting Council and the UK Public Oversight Board (POB) annual accountancy 
profession statistics) focus on CR4 for a restricted (and unreported) number of 
companies.  
In a published study of the entire population of UK listed companies, Beattie et al. 
(2003) analysed the effect of Andersen’s demise on audit market concentration (on a 
pro forma basis) and estimated that the top four firms were likely to increase their 
market share from about 67% to 73% and from about 90% to 96% on the basis of 
number of audits and audit fees, respectively.  The study identified that the levels of 
concentration were significantly higher in premier market segments (i.e. FTSE 100 
and 250) and in certain industry sectors.  Based on actual data drawn from Public 
Accounting Reports, Feldman (2006) reports that Andersen’s exit from the market 
increased concentration by the top four firms from 85% to 95%.  
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High and rising levels of audit market concentration have been reported in numerous 
academic studies undertaken in non-UK countries (e.g., in the US: Wolk et al., 2001 
and GAO, 2003; in Australia: Thavapalan et al., 2002; in Germany: Quick and Wolz, 
1999; in international markets: Choi and Zeghal, 1999; Narasimhan and Chung, 1998; 
in the EU: Ballas, 2005).  For example, in the US the top four firms audited 63% of 
total public companies’ sales in 1988, rising to 71% by 1997 and 99% by 2002 (GAO, 
2003).17
2.5 Evidence on the consequences of concentration 
Evidence from audit market concentration studies suggests that increased market 
concentration does not necessarily decrease competition.  For instance, while the 
merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand increased the Big 5 
market share at the aggregate market level, Thavapalan et al. (2002) report that, for a 
number of industry sectors in Australia, a more equitable spread of audit clients 
between the Big 5 firms was achieved.  The GAO studies (2003; 2008) also found no 
empirical evidence to support the contention that competition in the audit service 
market has been impaired, similar to the earlier studies such as Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980) and Danos and Eichenseher (1986).   
2.6 Consequences of Andersen’s demise 
Many studies have investigated the impact of Andersen’s demise on issues other than 
concentration, in particular, auditor selection decisions and audit pricing.  In an 
analytical paper, Schloetzer (2006) analyses a Cournot model of oligopoly to explore 
the impact of Andersen’s break-up.  The model predicts that the number of audits 
completed by the remaining Big 4 audit firms will decline, due to short-run capacity 
constraints, creating an increase in switching to non-Big 4 firms.  He reports evidence 
consistent with this prediction.  Empirical studies of audit pricing following 
Andersen’s demise mostly relate to the US market.  Chi (2006), using US data, finds 
that audit fees across all companies have generally risen following the Andersen 
event.  However, the phenomenon of initial fee discounting is apparent, and among 
Big 4 clients is statistically greater for former Andersen clients than for non-former 
Andersen clients.  Asthana et al. (2009) report that audit fees and the audit fee rate (as 
a percentage of total assets) of US companies rose markedly in 2002 following the 
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Enron scandal, especially for larger, riskier clients.  However, they find that former 
Andersen clients actually pay lower audit fees in 2002 compared to continuing clients 
of the Big 4 firms, which is evidence consistent with a competitive market for former 
Andersen clients.  Kealey et al. (2007) examine, for a sample of 547 US companies, 
the impact of audit firm tenure on the level of audit fees paid to Andersen’s successor 
auditors.  The observed positive relationship is attributed to the perceived higher level 
of client risk associated with longer tenure.  The change in audit fees arising from the 
change in auditor is not, however, explored.  Kohlbeck et al. (2008) report that clients 
who followed their Andersen audit team paid about the same as in the previous year 
(i.e., they neither received a ‘low-balling’ discount nor paid a premium).  Those that 
did not follow the Andersen audit team but moved to another Big 4 auditor paid a 
premium fee while companies hiring a non-Big 4 audit firm obtained a discounted 
audit fee, broadly similar in size to the amount of low-balling discount in non-
Andersen audit changes.  Similarly, Vermeer et al. (2008) find that ‘follower’ clients 
paid 16% lower audit fees than non-followers.  More generally, Huang et al. (2009) 
and Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) find that, in the post-SOX era, Big 4 clients no 
longer receive an initial audit fee discount.   
Outside the US, where the reputational effect of Andersen’s demise may have been 
less pronounced, evidence is limited.  Hamilton et al. (2008), using Australian data, 
conclude that overall the market remained competitive following Andersen’s break-
up. However, they find higher premiums generally for Big 4 audits post-Andersen and 
the audit fee data reported for former Andersen clients show an above-inflation rise in 
aggregate audit fees of 9.8% (derived from Table 1, panel B), though these are not 
adjusted for the apparent changes (reductions) in auditee size; aggregate NAS for 
former Andersen clients declined by 1%.  The only UK study to date is an 
unpublished study by Basioudis and Papadimitriou (2007), who find no change in 
inflation-adjusted audit fees between 2001 and 2002 for former Andersen clients (the 
unadjusted increase is 10%). Their analysis, however, is based on a restricted sample 
of only 63 companies.  Thus, the available evidence in relation to the pricing effect of 
Andersen’s demise is conflicting.   
Researchers have noted that standard, single period cross-sectional audit fee models 
do not address ‘the dynamics of changes in audit fees’ and that call for further 
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research on this important issue (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007, p.198).  The Andersen 
failure offers a quasi-experimental setting in which the factors impacting changes in 
audit fees can be observed.18   
 
3.  METHODS 
The audit market examined in the present study concerns the auditors of all domestic 
UK companies listed on both the main and AIM markets of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) for the period 1998 through 2003. Information about companies, 
their auditors and FTSE industry classification was extracted from the Waterlow 
Stock Exchange Yearbook (SEYB).19  Accounting data (sales, total assets and audit 
fees) were mainly sourced from Datastream with recourse to FAME and annual 
reports to fill in missing data. These data requirements reduced the sample size and 
led to the exclusion of investment trust companies, in particular. For companies 
identified as having changed auditors, audit firm details were cross-checked against 
annual reports or, in the few situations where these were not available, against data in 
FAME.  
Changes in the audit market can be caused by the entry and exit of companies to and 
from the stock exchange.  Information about newly listed companies, re-admission 
and new issues was obtained from the ‘Primary market fact sheet’ published by the 
LSE.  Information about delisted companies was sourced from Hemscott, Datastream 
and Citytext. Audit firm mergers in the 1998 to 2003 period were identified from 
Boys (2003) and individual audit firms’ web pages. 
Three measures of market concentration have been applied previously in audit market 
studies. The two widely used measures are the k-firm concentration ratio (CR) and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HI) – see Pong (1999, p.455) for a description of these 
measures. The third measure, the Gini Coefficient, though used in many economic 
related studies to measure inequality in wealth, is relatively new to audit market 
studies.  It captures the inequality between market participants (see Quick and Wolz 
(1999) for a description and application of this measure).  All three measures provide 
an indication of market concentration for the aggregate audit market. To obtain more 
 12
information about the dominance of individual participating firms, the calculation of 
individual audit firms’ market share is required.   
Four different measures of market share have been used to date.  The number of 
audits is perhaps the most commonly used measure; it is intuitive, facilitates 
reconciliation with changes in the population of consumers and auditor switches and 
its calculation requires knowledge only of the identity of the auditor.  However, the 
existence of an audit is a poor measure of activity level and so, in settings where audit 
fees are disclosed, audit fees are used as the measure of choice.  Concentration 
measures based on number of audits, while highly correlated with measures based on 
audit fees, are known to be systematically lower due to the ‘size effect’, whereby 
large companies tend to employ large audit firms.  In settings where audit fees are not 
disclosed, inferior measures of total assets or total sales are used to proxy activity 
level; in the present study, the preferred measure of audit fees is used.   
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the six-year period.  The number of 
companies decreased from 1,607 in 1998 to 1,386 in 2003, with the number of audit 
firms decreasing from 85 to 72.20 To put this trend into context, in 1968 there were 
1,109 audit firms active in the public listed market (Briston and Kedslie, 1985). 
Further, the 72 ‘active’ audit firms represent a tiny proportion of the nearly 20,000 
accounting firms in the UK (International Financial Services, 2003). The small 
number of ‘active’ audit firms suggests significant barriers to entry in the public listed 
company audit market.  It may be noted that a similar number of ‘active’ firms (85) 
audit the much larger US market (7,006 public companies) (Who Audits America, 
2003). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The mean values for both values of auditee company size (total assets and sales) 
increased by considerably more than inflation over the period (see RPI change in 
Table 2, row 4).  However, the median values of total assets and sales, which are not 
influenced by outliers, fell by 10% and 20%, respectively.  Jointly, this reflects an 
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increase in the numbers of both large and very small companies since 1998.  A 
comparison of the size distributions (based on total assets) in 1998 and 2003 shows 
that the proportion of companies with assets above £500 million increased from 16% 
to 20%, and the proportion below £30 million from 37% to 42%.  
Over the six year period, mean (median) audit fees rose by 35% (10%) compared with 
general price inflation of 11%.  This may reflect high increases in audit fees for large 
companies and/or the higher proportion of large companies in the population already 
identified.  To explore whether the increase in audit fees merely reflects an increase in 
client size, the rate of audit fees per unit of size is reported (see last two panels in 
Table 2).  In terms of aggregate audit fee charged related to total assets, the rate fell 
from 1998 to a low in 2001 then picked up in 2002; the trend based on sales was 
broadly similar. The mean and median values of individual fee rates (scaled by total 
assets) show increases in audit fee rate in 2001 and 2002.21  By contrast, both mean 
and median audit fee rates based on sales started to increase earlier (in 2000) and 
showed a decrease by 2003.   
One plausible explanation for the mid-period increase is the regulatory and public 
response to Andersen’s misconduct. Following the downfall of Andersen and the 
subsequent public concern about audit quality, companies had a smaller number of 
large auditors to choose from, so the remaining audit firms had greater market power. 
The early increase in audit fee rates in 2001 can perhaps be linked to the auditing 
industry atmosphere during the period. As widely reported in the press, the Enron 
scandal began in 2000, with Enron filing for the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in U.S. history in 2001. 
Audit fee rates (research question 1) 
To further investigate how Andersen’s demise and related events affected the cost of 
audits, audit fee rates (per £000 total assets) for each size decile of companies are 
analysed for each of the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 (see Table 3 and Figure 1). The 
graph in Figure 1 clearly shows that, as expected, due to fixed costs and audit scale 
economies, the audit fee rate decreases as company size increases. Comparison over 
time reveals that the mean (and median) audit fee rate increased between 2001 and 
2003 for each decile of company size.  However, as shown in Table 3, the smallest 
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companies have experienced a major (and statistically significant) increase of 155% 
(53%) in mean (median) audit fee rates, in contrast to an increase of 13% (19%) for 
the largest companies.  
Thus, there is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 for 
smaller audit clients. However, attribution of causation is not straightforward and 
several possible explanations exist. First, the increase might reflect a genuine 
‘Andersen effect’: either auditors have undertaken additional audit work (e.g. 
additional substantive audit evidence collection following the partial rejection of the 
risk-based audit techniques pioneered by KPMG in the 1990s (Power, 2007)) and 
passed on the increased costs to clients or, perhaps, they have taken advantage of their 
increased market power following the reduction to four top tier auditors. Second, 
smaller companies might be perceived to be more risky, resulting in a higher 
insurance component in the audit fee in the changed audit environment. Third, Big 4 
auditors might have adopted a strategy of reducing their client portfolios through 
auditing fewer clients, retaining only those small company clients willing to pay a 
higher fee. Finally, the price rises might reflect a general economic improvement 
which enabled auditors to catch up on price increases delayed as a result of the 2001 
UK downturn. 
INSERT TABLE 3 and FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Aggregate audit market concentration (research question 2) 
Table 4 reports the level of auditor concentration from 1998 to 2003 using two 
different measures of market share22 and three different measures of concentration 
(CR – rows 1-4; HI – row 5; and Gini – rows 6-7). Based on both market share 
measures, the CR4 concentration ratio increased over the six-year period, particularly 
in 2002 and 2003 with the transfer of a majority of Andersen clients to other Big 4 
auditors (see later).  However, the aggregate market share of the large top tier auditors 
(shown as CR (Big 5/4) in the table) generally increased by much less. A notable 
contradiction here is the CR (Big 5/4) market share based on number of audits, which 
fell every year in the period (a pattern not shared with the Australian market 
(Hamilton et al., 2008)); over the six year period the decline from 76% to 68% was 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, audit fee income for top tier 
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auditors has risen while the number of auditees has fallen. This is consistent with the 
argument and evidence that the Big 5/4 auditors have shifted their client portfolio 
towards larger, less risky, clients (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 
2006; Hogan and Martin, 2009).23  CR6 and CR20 have been relatively stable over the 
six-year period across both measures. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Focusing on the concentration statistics based on the preferred audit fee proxy (panel 
B), the level of audit market concentration in the UK during the 6 year period has 
remained very high. In 1998 the top tier firms (then Big 5) audited 95% of the market 
and by 2003 this had grown to 96% (now Big 4). The increases in CR4 and CR6 over 
the period are statistically significant at the 1% level (2-tail).  Looking back to 1991,24 
the top tier (then Big 6) had a markedly lower market share of 89% (Pong, 1999).  
The domination of the top tier firms clearly exceeds the economists’ 60% tight 
oligopoly threshold (Shepherd, 1997). The UK domestic listed audit market was a 
tight oligopoly by any market share proxy during the period of the present study (and 
back to 1991 at least). The lowest CR (Big5/4) was 68% in 2003 (number of audits) 
but was consistently above 94% based on audit fees. Such high concentration levels 
facilitate the possibility of successful collusion, overt or tacit, between the top firms.  
In contrast to the k-firm concentration ratio, the more comprehensive HI and Gini 
coefficients for the whole market suggest a slight net decline in audit market 
concentration over the six year period. This contrasts with evidence from the US 
which finds concentration to have increased (Feldman, 2006). These contrasting 
outcomes can perhaps be attributed to the substantially smaller market share of 
Andersen in the UK compared to the US; based on audit fees for 2001, Andersen’s 
market share was 8.8% in the UK (Pong and Burnett, 2006) and 15.9% in the US 
(Feldman, 2006).  In the UK, the HI measure fell between 1998 and 2001 to 25.0 after 
which it began to rise slowly to 27.0 in 2003. The 2001 value is almost identical to the 
24.8 reported by Pong and Burnett (2006) but the 25.8 for 2002 is slightly higher than 
the 23.0 which McMeeking et al. (2007) report, based on their smaller sample.  The 
Gini coefficient for the whole market (penultimate row in each panel) declined 
slightly to 2000 and then remained broadly stable. 
 16
In the US, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission classify the 
HI into three regions with a value below 10 characterising an unconcentrated market, 
a value between 10 to 18 characterising a moderately concentrated market and a value 
above 18 characterising a highly concentrated market (GAO, 2003). The present study 
reports an HI (based on number of audits) ranging between 12 and 14 (signalling 
moderate concentration).  However, HI based on audit fees ranged between 25 and 28, 
signalling a highly concentrated audit market with potential for significant market 
power. 
The Gini (whole market) coefficient remained very high throughout the entire period 
suggesting considerable inequality of market share across auditor participants.  
However, while the Andersen demise had little impact on the overall picture, it has 
markedly reduced the level of inequality between the top tier firms. Looking back to 
1991 and 1995, the Gini coefficients for top tier (then Big 6) market share based on 
audit fees were 29 and 30, respectively.25  The final row in panel B reports the Gini 
(Big 5/4) coefficient for the study period.  In 1998, the coefficient had risen to 48 (for 
the Big 5) but the impact of the redistribution of former Andersen clients reduced this 
to 30 (for the Big 4) by 2003.26 Thus, the equality of audit market share for the four 
top tier firms has now returned to the level it was at prior to the Price 
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger. This is explored further in the next section. 
4.3 Individual firm market share at market level (research question 3) 
Given the current interest in auditor choice and the viability of a challenge to the Big 
4 by mid-tier firms (FRC, 2007b), analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit 
firm level (for the top tier and six leading mid tier firms).  Several observations can be 
made from the detailed analysis of market shares by individual firm shown in Table 5. 
Based on audit fee ranking, PwC was the market leader with total market share of 
about 40%, a level that industrial organisation theorists cite as the cut-off level to 
identify the existence of a ‘dominant firm’ (Beattie et al., 2003).  It is interesting to 
note that the PwC market share was always markedly higher than that of the number 
two firm throughout the period.  KPMG, the nearest rival, held only 23-26% of the 
market share.  According to Shepherd (1997), a dominant firm usually has two effects 
on prices similar to those of pure monopoly. First, they raise the level of their prices, 
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often (though not always) gaining excess profits. Second, they engage in price 
discrimination.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Over the full 1998 to 2003 period, the market share of PwC and KPMG declined 
slightly (both number of audits and audit fees) while that of Ernst & Young declined 
based on number of audits but increased a little based on audit fees. Following its 
acquisition of Andersen, Deloitte gained considerably both in terms of audit fees and 
number of audits during 2002 and 2003. Interestingly, these gains continued an 
upward trend that started much earlier than Andersen’s demise and saw its market 
share almost double (number of audits) with a larger increase based on audit fees. 
Overall, the Big 4 are now more closely aligned in terms of audit market share as 
indicated by the Gini coefficients discussed in the previous section. 
By contrast, the audit fee market share gap between the Big 4 and other smaller firms 
has become wider over the 6 year period. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing 
the market shares of Ernst & Young, the smallest of the Big 4, and of the non-Big 4 
auditors. Based on audit fees, E&Y had 13% market share in 2003, which was more 
than three times as large as the entire non-Big 4 market share (4%). BDO Stoy 
Hayward, the closest rival to the Big 4, held just above 1% market share, indicating its 
very weak position relative to the Big 4.  It is worth noting, however, that the mid-tier 
consolidation merger between Grant Thornton and Robson Rhodes in the summer of 
2007 serves to narrow the gap slightly.  
4.4 Changes in Big 5/4 market dominance (research question 4) 
To examine the underlying factors that have contributed to changes in concentration, a 
decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the 
1998 to 2003 period is presented in Table 6.  The impact of four distinct consumer-
based reasons for change is calculated: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; 
and (in the case of audit fees measure only) audit fee changes. Panels A and B focus 
on number of audits and audit fees, respectively. Leaver companies include those that 
were acquired, failed, went private or left the market for any other reason. The 
analysis of joiners recognises that some joiners may have left the market by 2003.  
The analysis of switchers focuses on non-par auditor changes (i.e., those involving a 
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change in audit firm tier).  In total, there were 464 switches, representing 5.8% per 
annum using the number of audits in 1998 (1607) as the baseline; of these, almost half 
(202) were non-par changes. 
Panel A shows an overall reduction in Big 5/4 market share of 7.4% (from 75.9% to 
68.5%) based on number of audits.  The Big 5/4 audited about 75% of the leaver 
companies that were listed in 1998, closely in line with their overall market share in 
1998. However, they had a much smaller market share (51%) of companies joining 
the market since 1998, which accounts for the overall reduction in the Big 5/4 market 
share based on number of audits. The impact of non-par switches between Big 5/4 and 
other auditing firms was broadly neutral, with the Big 5/4 showing a small net loss of 
4 audits.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The analysis of market share based on audit fees (Panel B) shows differences in the 
scale and overall impact of factors. The Big 5/4 market share shows an overall 
increase between 1998 and 2003 of 1.0% (from 94.9% to 95.9%). The Big 5/4’s 
lower market share of leavers (91%) implies a higher market share of continuing 
companies, up 1.4% from 94.9% to 96.3%.  This represents the largest cause of the 
overall change in concentration. The change in continuing clients’ audit fees had a 
small negative impact on concentration (decline of 0.5%).  While the Big 5/4 audited 
just over half of joiners, these tended to be the larger joining companies so the audit 
fees represented 88% of the total for joiners. Of these joiners, 62 had left the market 
by 2003 and the Big 5/4 share of their audit fees was 76%. Together, this left the Big 
5/4 with 91% market share of joiner audit fees. However, as this was below their 
overall 1998 market share, the impact was to reduce slightly their market share, 
contributing a reduction of 0.5% in concentration. While there was a very small net 
loss of audits by Big 5/4 to others, the Big 5/4 actually achieved a net gain in audit 
fees from voluntary auditor change of £2.8 million; this led to a small rise (0.6%) in 
audit fee market share.  
In summary, since 1998 the Big 5/4 have a smaller number of audits (279 fewer), 
primarily because they audit a smaller number of new entrants to the market. 
However, they have managed to increase audit fees (by £66 million) and their share of 
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audit fees, as a result of two main factors. First, the Big 5/4 have retained a larger 
share of audit fees for companies that have remained in the market. This is consistent 
with the retention of Big 5/4 auditors by companies that have grown either organically 
or by acquisition. Second, they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result 
of switches. This may reflect a Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding audits which they 
perceive to be high-risk, as evidenced in the US (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; 
Rama and Read, 2006). 
4.5 Industry concentration (research question 5) 
Beattie et al. (2003) showed that in 2002 the Big 5 audited the entire FTSE 100 
companies and almost 98% of the FTSE 250 companies.27 Apart from auditor 
reputation, it has been argued that an auditor’s technical capability in specific industry 
sectors is the main factor that causes large companies to choose a top tier auditor 
(Neal and Riley, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2006; Knechel et al., 2007). This industry-
specific technical capability can be achieved by specialisation, at both the national and 
city level (Ferguson et al., 2006; Basioudis and Francis, 2007).28  Table 7 presents 
auditor market share (based on audit fees) in industry sectors for 2003. This shows 
that one of the Big 4 firms was the market leader in every one of the 34 industry 
sectors.  PwC was the leader in 18 industries, KPMG was the leader in eight, while 
Deloitte and Ernst & Young were both leaders in four industries.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
There is no consensus on the level of market share that indicates industry specialism. 
Prior studies have used various levels of market share including 10% and 20% 
(Craswell et al., 1995), 30% (Knechel et al., 2007) and more recently 50% (Beattie et 
al., 2003).  Table 7 identifies the market leader in each sector (underlined) as well as 
the auditors in the 20 sectors where a market share of at least 50% is held (in bold).  
From the table, the leading position of PwC among the Big 4 is clear (see summary at 
bottom of table).  PwC audits the entire tobacco sector (3 companies) and has more 
than 90% market share in the oil and gas (31 companies) and steel and other metals (4 
companies) sectors.  Overall, PwC is the market leader in 18 sectors and has at least 
50% market share in 11 sectors.  By comparison KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young 
have at least 50% market share in only six, one and two sectors, respectively. In the 
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UK in 2003, the average market share of the industry leader (across 29 non-financial 
sectors) was 58%, with the second ranking firm having 22%.29
Focussing on the relatively large sectors (by number of companies), 17 contain 30 or 
more companies (Craswell et al., 1995). PwC was market leader in 10 of these large 
sectors. Just five sectors had a market leader auditor with at least 50% market share 
(PwC for 4 sectors and Ernst & Young for 1). Based on market capitalisation, there 
were 13 sectors larger than £50 billion. However, only PwC and KPMG had more 
than 50% market share in those sectors (PwC for 3 sectors and KPMG for 3). PwC 
was the market leader in six sectors, while KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young were 
the leaders in four, two and one sector, respectively. 
In aggregate, the Big 4 clearly dominated all sectors, with their lowest market share 
being 87% (in Housing Goods & Textiles, a sector with a large number of small 
companies). The Big 4 has complete dominance in four sectors: Forestry & Paper, 
Tobacco, Banks and Life Assurance.  The dominance of one or two Big 4 auditors in 
a significant number of sectors is likely to be of concern to companies desiring an 
industry-specialist auditor. It implies that their choice is severely restricted, especially 
if they wish to avoid the auditor of a competitor. Further, while most of the sectors 
dominated by a single Big 4 auditor (>50% market share) are relatively small in terms 
of the number of companies (26% of the 1,386 companies are in such sectors), they 
represent a significant part of the market with 52% of market capitalisation. 
In eleven sectors, however, one or more mid-tier firms did claim a significant 
presence (≥ 2% audit fees) and in 9 sectors a mid-tier firm’s market share exceeded 
that of one of the B4 firms.  There were only two mid-tier firm sector market shares in 
excess of 5% - BDO Stoy Hayward held 7.8% in General Retailers and Grant 
Thornton held 7.3% in Electronic & Electrical Equipment.  But, in two further sectors, 
‘other’ smaller non-Big 4 auditors (i.e., firms not identified separately in the table) in 
aggregate held significant market shares – 6.9% in Housing Goods and Textiles and 
5.9% in Diversified Industrials. These findings offer some hope that, if the 
recommendations of the FRC (2007b) audit choice study are put in place, mid-tier 
firms may, in the medium-term, represent viable alternatives to a B4 auditor.   
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4.6 Analysis of auditor choice and fees paid by former Andersen clients (research 
question 6) 
In 2001, Andersen had 97 clients who changed auditor the following year, while in 
2002 Andersen had 36 clients remaining (those with fiscal year ended before August). 
As the focus in this section is a pre/post comparison, eight companies that delisted in 
2002 or 2003 were removed, leaving 125 former Andersen clients for analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 provides a summary for former Andersen clients of the successor auditor 
(panel A) and, for each successor, aggregate audit fees, median audit fee rates pre and 
post change, aggregate NAS fees and aggregate total fees (panels B to E, 
respectively).  Different rows of the table distinguish different key groupings of audit 
firms – in particular, the B4 excluding Deloitte, in addition to the B4 and non-B4.  
Panel A shows that Deloitte, Andersen’s UK acquirer, captured 93 (74%) former 
Andersen clients; 21 (17%) companies moved to another Big 4 auditor and 11 (9%) 
chose non-Big 4 firms.  The largest non-Big 4 beneficiaries were BDO Stoy Hayward 
and Robson Rhodes, both second tier firms with international operations.  The 
percentage of companies that switched to another Big 4 was slightly higher in the UK 
than in the US. The GAO (2003) study reported that 86% of former Andersen clients 
chose another Big 4 auditor (including Deloitte) and 14% switched to a non-Big 4 
auditor. In the US, the switch to other Big 4 firms was more uniform than in the UK: 
Ernst & Young (26%); KPMG (25%); Deloitte (20%); and PwC (15%).  Of 1,085 
former Andersen US clients, the study reported that 717 (66%) companies switched to 
non-Deloitte Big 4 (compared to only 17% in the UK).   
Andersen clients’ global preference towards another Big 4 firm is not unexpected 
given the international reputation and capability of the Big 4.  The figures in Table 8 
give an indication of the redistribution of clients that might occur if there were to be a 
further reduction from a B4 to a B3 (a scenario considered by FRC, 2007b).  In 
addition, the importance to such companies of restoring investor and other stakeholder 
confidence was high. For example, Chaney and Philipich (2002) provide evidence that 
many former Andersen clients had experienced negative market reaction when 
Andersen admitted to shredding Enron’s documents. 
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Panel B reports aggregate audit fees.  For new Big 4 auditors, aggregate audit fees 
rose by 4.0% in contrast to a decline of -12.0% for new non-Big 4 auditors; the 
median change in audit fees for new Big 4 auditors was 0.0% compared with -10.0% 
for non-Big 4.  Across all clients, the change in aggregate audit fees was 3.8%, 
broadly in line with inflation, with a median audit fee change of 0.0%.  Thus, in 
contrast with prior US and Australian research, there is no evidence of general above-
inflation audit fee rises in the UK following Andersen’s demise.  
Similarly, there is no evidence of general fee discounting on initial audit engagement 
for former Andersen clients, in contrast with the evidence reported by Chi (2006) for 
the US.  Ernst & Young gained the largest clients (based on total assets) and also 
achieved above-inflation audit fee increases of 11.7%, in aggregate.  Not surprisingly, 
the non-Big 4 gains were typically smaller companies with smaller audit fees.  The 
median decline in audit fee of -10.0% in respect of non-Big 4 successor auditors can 
be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more significant fee 
discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in the US by 
Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006 and Kohlbeck et al., 2008). 
The overall 5.0% rise in audit fees for moves to Deloitte Touche, the acquirer of the 
Andersen UK business, is slightly above the rate of inflation.  This is broadly 
consistent with the ‘no change’ result for clients who followed the Andersen audit 
team in the US (Kohlbeck et al., 2008).  However, in contrast with their results, the 
aggregate audit fee increase for moves to other Big 4 auditors of 1.6% (median 
change of 0.0%) provides no evidence of a fee premium in the UK. 
The audit fee rates (audit fees per £000 total assets) reported in Panel C seek to take 
client size changes over the year of change into account (albeit imperfectly).  Medians 
are reported to reduce the impact of outliers, though the small sample size for non-Big 
4 auditees and for individual Big 4 successors (except DT) still affects the stability of 
the median.  However, the median percentage change in audit fee rate was 3.0% 
(1.7%) for Big 4 (non-Big 4) and 2.4% overall; all are positive but again broadly in 
line with inflation, confirming that the audit fee results are not driven by changes in 
client size. 
 23
Overall, the lack of clear evidence of real (i.e. above inflation) audit fee rises for 
Andersen clients is perhaps surprising.  These clients had a smaller pool of (large) 
audit firms from which to choose (especially when specialisation and refusal to 
appoint competitors’ auditors are considered), which creates a demand pressure.  The 
clients were also in a relatively weak bargaining position given their need to rebuild 
confidence.  It suggests that either there was still sufficient competition to negate 
oligopolistic excesses, or the Big 4 did not seek to extract excess profits, politically 
aware that their actions would be closely monitored. 
Panel D reports the level of NAS provided by Andersen and by the successor auditor.  
It is interesting to consider whether the incentives to reduce NAS to counter a 
perceived lack of auditor independence are greater than the benefits of knowledge 
spillovers and/or of the cross-subsidisation of audit fees.  Overall, it is clear that 
reported NAS fees (i.e. those provided by the auditor) fell significantly in aggregate 
following Andersen’s demise: for Big 4 successors by -20%, for non-Big 4 by -47% 
and overall by -20%; the median change in NAS was -13.2% overall and -17.1% for 
the major acquirer DT.  Similarly, total fees (audit plus NAS) paid by auditees 
declined, by -12.2% overall (Panel E) with a median change of -3.9%.  Thus, there is 
no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit 
fee by NAS.  The evidence is consistent with the notion that audit firms and their 
clients responded to publicly-expressed concerns that NAS provision has the potential 
to affect external perceptions of auditor independence. 
However, the detail shows that two audit firms (PwC and KPMG) did generate higher 
NAS fees than Andersen from the clients it took over. PwC generated an additional 
£0.7m NAS, also leading to an increase in total fees of £0.5m; the equivalent 
increases for KPMG were £0.5m (NAS) and £0.3m (total fees). The median changes 
in NAS for the individual four B4 auditors were: KPMG +8.4%; PwC 0.0%; DT 
-17.1%; and EY -52.6%. While this suggests that both KPMG and PwC may have 
gained, possibly from cross-subsidisation of audit fees by NAS income, this needs 
cautious interpretation given the very small sample sizes.  Further, given the major 
market share of PwC (Pong and Burnett, 2006), it is perhaps likely that PwC was 
already providing a higher level of consultancy services to Andersen-audited 
companies than other audit firms.  Any consultancy provided by the successor auditor 
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prior to its commencement as auditor would need to be reported in the financial 
statements as NAS, potentially with greater impact for PwC than other firms.    
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and audit fee rates in the 
UK domestic listed company market during a crucial period of structural market 
change (i.e., following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ merger and encompassing 
Andersen’s demise, 1998-2003).  Concentration is shown to have been consistently 
high throughout the period, characteristic of a ‘tight oligopoly’.  However, there is 
clear evidence that concentration has, in a number of respects, shown a declining 
trend over the six-year period, indicating that Andersen’s demise has reduced the level 
of inequality between the top tier firms.  
The main factor underlying the drop in Big 5/4 concentration based on number of 
audits was the relatively small number of audits gained from joiners.  This finding 
implies that, if the mid-tier firms that dominate this market segment can retain these 
clients as they grow, then market concentration will decrease.  The main factor 
underlying the slight increase in Big 5/4 concentration based on audit fees was the 
retention of Big 5/4 auditors by companies that have grown.  A secondary factor was 
that they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result of switches.  This may 
reflect investor and client preferences for a top tier auditor as companies grow, or a 
Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding the smaller (and therefore higher-risk) companies (Jones 
and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006).  The rate of auditor change over the 
period (5.8% p.a.), was higher than reported in prior UK studies (4.1% p.a. in Beattie 
and Fearnley, 1994; 4.5% p.a. in Pong, 1999).  This could reflect increased 
competition brought about, in particular, by increased audit committees activity in 
relation to auditor selection and appointment during this period (due to regulatory 
pronouncements in relation to corporate governance such as the Hampel Report 
(1998) and the Smith Committee guidance (2003)).   
Extant evidence from Australia and the UK indicates that it is industry specialism, at 
both national and city level, and not just brand name that contributes to fee premia 
and auditor selection choices (Ferguson et al., 2003; 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006; 
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Basioudis and Francis, 2007).  This study found that in eleven sectors, one or more 
mid-tier firms audited at least 2% audit fees, and in 9 sectors a mid-tier firm’s market 
share exceeded that of one of the B4 firms.  It is concluded that an effective challenge 
from the mid-tier firms could be made in these industries, especially if these firms 
adopted an investment and marketing strategy based on industry specialism. This 
challenge would be assisted by the implementation of the recommendations of the 
FRC (2007b) audit choice study.   
Andersen’s demise served to reduce the level of inequality between the top tier firms, 
with Deloitte capturing approximately 70% of Andersen clients and total audit fees.  
Thus, consistent with the findings of Comunale and Sexton (2003) in the US context 
and Ballas (2005) in the EU context (but contrary to popular belief) the exit of a top 
tier firm does not necessarily result in increased market concentration.  However, 
PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’, with 40% market share (based on audit 
fees) and market leader status in 18 out of 34 industry sectors in 2003.   
 
There is evidence that the audit fee rate of listed UK companies increased markedly 
following Andersen’s demise, especially in the case of the smallest companies.  
Several possible explanations exist.  First, the Enron scandal may have lifted the 
intense downward pressure on audit fees by companies, due to their desire to instil 
confidence about audit quality in the financial market participants after this was 
damaged by Andersen’s misconduct (the ‘Andersen effect’).  Thus, companies wanted 
more effort from their auditor, placing upward pressure on audit fees.  Second, 
smaller companies may be perceived to be more risky, resulting in a higher insurance 
component in the audit fee. Third, Big 4 auditors may have adopted a strategy of 
reducing their client portfolios through auditing fewer small (possibly riskier) clients, 
retaining only those small company clients that were willing to pay a substantially 
higher fee. The finding that Big 4 audit market share (in terms of clients) has fallen 
significantly could reflect some small companies switching auditor to avoid such a fee 
increase.  Moreover, since audit firms undertook additional audit work as a result of 
the Andersen effect, they may have hit capacity constraints, forcing resignations from 
certain engagements (small, risky client companies).30 Finally, the audit fee rises may 
simply reflect changes in the general economic climate.   
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In relation to former Andersen clients, there was no significant above-inflation change 
in audit fees paid by them to their new auditors.  The lack of evidence to indicate that 
recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing is consistent with 
Duxbury et al.’s (2007) modelling of the UK setting.  It contrasts, however, with the 
evidence in Australia, where former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees (Hamilton 
et al., 2008) and in the US, where initial fee discounts were reported (Chi, 2006).  For 
non-Big 4 successor auditors in the UK, we find a median decline in audit fee of 
-10.0%. This can be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more 
significant fee discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in 
the US by Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006).  Moves to Big 4 auditors other than Deloitte 
Touche (who acquired most of the Andersen UK business) were not accompanied by 
an audit fee premium yet there was also no evidence of general fee discounting, both 
in contrast with the US (Chi, 2006).  Overall, the UK audit market response to 
Andersen’s decline seems to have been relatively benign, leading to a restrained 
‘business as usual’ effect. 
The lower level of observed NAS in the year of change to a new auditor following 
Andersen’s demise provides little evidence of either knowledge spillover effects or 
cross-subsidisation of audit fees.  Rather, it is consistent with a client (and audit firm) 
response to concerns over the potential impact of NAS on perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes 
have resulted in anticompetitive pricing in the UK listed company audit market.  The 
key concerns remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the 
governance and accountability of audit firms. There is no reason to expect that this 
conclusion would be substantively different if another top tier audit firm ceased.  
While concentration levels may increase if the market leader (PwC) was one of the 
remaining three firms and obtained a significant proportion of the demised firm’s 
clients, strong forces in the audit market maintain competitiveness.  However, the 
choice problem would become extremely critical.  The most recent progress report on 
choice in the UK audit market FRC (2009) reports on measures designed to aid 
market solutions to high concentration levels.  Concentration levels as at August 2009 
are reported to be broadly stable, with the non-Big Four’s market share (based on 
number of audits) for the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap/Fledgling and AIM 
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market segments being 1%, 6%, 20.5% and 55.1%, respectively.  In the US, no 
‘immediate action’ to reduce concentration is considered necessary (GAO, 2008).  It 
appears that regulators are maintaining a careful watching brief to give market 
solutions the opportunity to take effect.  Given the often unintended adverse 
consequences of regulatory intervention, this approach seems optimal. 
 
Inevitably, this study suffers from limitations, some of which offer avenues for future 
research.  First, we only examine the short-term impact of Andersen’s demise; further 
research is required to consider the medium to long-term effects.  Second, the analysis 
does not distinguish follower from non-follower ex-Andersen clients, as we were 
unable to identify a public source of this data; US research has shown that this 
characteristic influenced post-auditor change fee levels.  Finally, further longitudinal 
research on recent industry effects in the UK market, building on the 2003 situation 
presented in this paper, would be desirable. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  On 31 May 2005, the US Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision to reverse this 
conviction. 
 
2 The firm also audited Worldcom, another company involved in accounting scandal.  This added 
another blow to Andersen and contributed to its dissolution. 
  
3 The six recommendations relating to concentration and competition are: reduce barriers to the growth 
of smaller auditing firms consistent with an overall policy goal of promoting audit quality; monitor 
potential sources of catastrophic risk faced by public company auditing firms and create a mechanism 
for the preservation and rehabilitation of troubled larger public company auditing firms; the PCAOB, in 
consultation with others, to determine the feasibility of developing key indicators of audit quality and 
effectiveness and requiring auditing firms to publicly disclose these indicators; promote the 
understanding of and compliance with auditor independence requirements among auditors, investors, 
public companies, audit committees, and boards of directors, in order to enhance investor confidence in 
the quality of audit processes and audits; annual shareholder ratification of public company auditors by 
all public companies be adopted; enhance regulatory collaboration and coordination between the 
PCAOB and its foreign counterparts. 
 
4 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the UK’s independent regulator responsible for promoting 
confidence in corporate reporting and governance. 
 
5 They are intended to: “increase the feasibility of investment in the supply of audit services to public 
interest entities by existing non-Big 4 firms or new firms; reduce the perceived risks to directors of 
selecting a non-Big 4 firm; improve the accountability of boards for their auditor selection decisions; 
improve choice from within the Big 4; reduce the risk of firms leaving the market without good reason; 
and reduce uncertainty and disruption costs in the event of a firm leaving the market.” 
 
6 Peel (1997) includes quoted and unquoted public limited companies and private companies. 
 
7 Another study investigates the frequency of individual changes during the 1990s but not the overall 
level of concentration (Moizer and Porter, 2004). 
 
8 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/business/1920887.stm  
 
9 Market power refers to conditions where the providers of a service can consistently charge prices 
above those that would be established by a competitive market. 
 
10 Barriers to entry restrict new entrants to the market at the top end in particular. 
 
11 The OFT (2004, paras 4.16-4.18) reported that the B4 firms have been subject to some of the highest 
cost increases but that professional indemnity insurance remains available to all.   
 
12 The main reasons for voluntary realignment in the UK during the 1990s have been shown to be high 
audit fee, dissatisfaction with the auditor’s ability to detect problems, and changes in company’s top 
management (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998).   
 
13 Moizer and Porter (2004, pp. 63-65) report that, out of 609 auditor changes, there were 294 (48%) 
auditor resignations, as evidenced by letters filed with the company registrar.  However, the audit 
partners interviewed by them suggested that ‘genuine mid-term resignations are very rare’.  They 
explained that most resignations resulted from the practice of putting audits out to tender; i.e. the 
existing auditor ‘resigns’ when a new auditor is appointed.  Such evidence casts serious doubt on the 
validity of categorising auditor changes based on resignation letters. 
 
14 The available evidence on this, which relates to the US market, is mixed - Johnstone and Bedard 
(2004) and Schloetzer (2006) find evidence that Big N firms retain clients with lower audit risk, while 
Landsman et al. (2009) attribute the adjustments in audit client portfolios to Andersen-induced capacity 
constraints rather that client risk aversion. 
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15 Investment trusts are generally excluded because a full set of financial data is not available. C4 
(based on audit fees) for investment trusts in 2002 was 0.90 (calculated from Table 3, p.259 of Beattie 
et al. (2003)) in comparison with 0.89 across all sectors. 
 
16 The figure of 85 firms in 1982 is based on the FT 500 only; the figure of 84 in 2003 is a pro forma 
figure. While Pong and Burnett (2006) include AIM companies in their sample (personal 
communication, 7 January 2008), their sample size is somewhat smaller than ours (see Table 2). 
 
17 Until recently, audit fee data was not publicly available in the US. 
 
18 The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would not have affected audit fees until 2004, the year that 
Section 404 became effective (Schloetzer, 2006, p11), and so is not a confounding effect in the analysis 
of audit fee changes in 2002-03. 
 
19 Previously known as the Macmillan Stock Exchange Yearbook.  
 
20 These figures will not have been affected by the increase in the audit exemption threshold which 
came into effect for year-ends on of after 30th March 2004 (see 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/infoAndGuide/faq/auditThresholds.shtml). 
 
21 To avoid gross distortion caused by extreme values, the 1% trimmed mean is reported. 
 
22 Concentration based on two more market share measures, auditee total assets and auditee sales, were 
also calculated. As the overall patterns of concentration are similar to those based on audit fees, they 
are not reported here in the interests of brevity. 
 
23 The willingness of firms to drop risky clients is illustrated by Deloitte’s resignation from Easier in 
2004 (Accountancy Age, 2005a) 
 
24 Pong (1999) is the first study to report audit market concentration for the full UK market based on 
audit fees. Although Moizer and Turley (1987) used audit fees, their sample was limited to FTSE500 
companies. 
 
25  These were calculated using data taken from Pong (1999, Table 3, p. 461). 
 
26 The temporary rise in the Gini coefficient to 46 for 2002 reflects the fact that a relatively small 
number of clients continued to be audited by Andersen, giving the firm a small market share and 
leading to a wider inequality of market shares between the 5 top tier auditors.  A broadly similar pattern 
of reduction in top tier inequality by 2003 is indicated in Panel A of Table 4, where the Gini coefficient 
is based on number of audits. However, the smaller Gini coefficients (e.g. 15 for 2003) imply a much 
lower level of inequality between the Big 4; i.e. the number of companies that each firm audits is quite 
similar. 
 
27 The FTSE 100 comprises the 100 largest companies (by market capitalisation) and the FTSE 250 
comprises next largest 250 companies. Together they comprise the largest 350 UK listed companies 
and account for 74% of listed companies’ total audit fees (Beattie et al., 2003). 
 
28 It has been shown that industry specialist auditors reduce earnings management attempts, indicating 
that they provide higher quality audits (e.g. Kwon et al., 2007). 
  
29 An interesting comparison is with the US market pre Andersen’s demise.  Based on 2000-01 audit 
fee data for 63 non-financial industries, Francis et al. (2005: 119) report that industry leaders had, on 
average, 50% of industry fees, with the second ranking firm having 22%. 
 
30 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the second and third possible explanations. 
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Table 1: Concentration in the UK listed company audit market: evidence from prior studies 1972-2007 
 
     No. of audits Audit fees 
Time           Paper Sample Sample size 
No. of active 
audit firms CR4 CR6 CR8 CR20
H 
Index CR4 CR6 CR8 CR20
H 
Index 
1972 Moizer & Turley (1987,1989) FT 500 498 144 0.37        0.44 0.50 4.6 0.47 0.60 0.66 7.1 
1982 Moizer & Turley (1987,1989) FT 500 499 85 0.42          0.54 0.63 6.6 0.54 0.69 0.79 9.4
1984 Briston & Kedslie (1985) Domestic          362 0.38 0.49 0.57 0.76
1987 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1642         216 0.43 0.55 0.64 0.83
1988 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1769         191 0.45 0.57 0.67 0.86
1989 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1871         174 0.45 0.57 0.68 0.88
1990 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 1978         167 0.59 0.72 0.79 0.90
1991 Beattie & Fearnley (1994) Domestic inc USM 1 2070         166 0.59 0.72 0.79 0.90
1991 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1211           0.57 0.70 0.79  0.77 0.89 0.93 15.9
1992 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1222  0.58 0.71 0.79   0.79 0.90 0.94   
1993 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1237  0.59 0.73 0.80   0.80 0.91 0.94   
1994 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1320  0.61 0.74 0.82   0.79 0.92 0.95   
1994/5 Narasimhan & Chung (1998) Domestic 1400  0.61 0.75 0.82  16.7 2      
1994/5 Peel (1997) Inc USM and AIM 3 1865           0.78 
1995 Pong (1999) Inc USM; exc inv trusts 1401            106 0.60 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.92 0.94 17.0
1997 Pong & Burnett (2006) Inc AIM; exc inv trusts 1280 86 0.61 0.77   11.4 0.81 0.94   17.6 
2001               Pong & Burnett (2006) Inc AIM; exc inv trusts 1094 66 0.64 13.4 0.86 24.8
2002 McMeeking et al. (2007) Sample of non-financial              309 0.80 22.0 0.88 23.0
2002             Beattie et al. (2003) Inc AIM 3 2180 85 0.67 0.86 0.89
2003 4 Beattie et al. (2003) Inc AIM 3 2180            84 0.73 0.89 0.96
2004 Oxera (2006) Selected listed exc AIM 5 676            0.97
2005 Oxera (2006) Selected listed exc AIM 6 865            0.93
2005              McMeeking (2007) FTSE 1007 100 1.00
2005 POB (2006) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .83          0
2006 POB (2006) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .83          0
2007 POB (2007) Main market exc AIM ~1000 8  .82          0
2007              FRC (2007b) FTSE 350 350 7 0.97
 
Notes:  1. USM was the Unlisted Securities Market; sample includes Irish companies. 
 2. Index calculated for top 8 firms only. 
 3. AIM is the Alternative Investment Market, secondary to the main market. 
 4. Pro forma following Andersen’s collapse, assuming all Andersen clients gained by Deloitte & Touche (the acquirer of Andersen UK). 
 5. Includes only companies with audit fees available from FAME database (approx. 69% of population). 
  6. Includes only those companies where auditor identity available from Datastream (approx. 89% of population, biased towards larger companies). 
 7. A second sample that also included 80 additional listed companies was also considered. 
8. Approximate sample size inferred from Table 23 (pp. 58-61) of POB (2007). 
 
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: UK domestic listed companies  
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1998 - 2003  change (%) 
Sample Size 1,607 1,498 1,479 1,539 1,497 1,386  
Number of Auditors 85 80 74 78 77 72  
Retail Price Index  (RPI) 163.4 165.6 171.1 174.4 176.2 181.3 11.0 
RPI Change (%) - +1.4 +3.3 +1.9 +1.0 +2.9  
   
Total Assets (£m)   
Mean 1,519 1,884 2,150 2,230 2,383 2,673 76.0 
Mean Change (%) - +24 +14 +4 +7 +12  
Median 53 58 57 50 45 48 -9.9 
Median Change (%) - +9 -2 -12 -11 +7  
Minimum 0.106 0.045 0.174 0.006 0.003 0.006  
Maximum 219,500 254,800 316,200 358,534 403,100 455,275  
   
Sales (£m)   
Mean 526 580 634 636 657 731 39.0 
Mean Change (%) - +10 +9 0 +3 +11  
Median 52 53 45 40 35 41 -20.4 
Median Change (%) - +1 -14 -12 -11 +17  
Minimum1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Maximum 33,340 37,017 51,503 49,254 60,826 49,039  
   
Audit fees (£000)   
Mean 252 268 268 270 301 339 34.5 
Mean Change (%) - +6 0 +1 +11 +13  
Median 68 70 69 68 71 75 10.3 
Median Change (%) - +3 -1 -1 +4 +6  
Minimum 2 3 2 2 3 1  
Maximum 14,431 14,172 16,926 13,892 15,901 17,920  
   
Audit fees per £000 total assets   
Aggregate2 0.166 0.142 0.125 0.121 0.126 0.127 -23.5 
Mean3 2.05 2.19 1.98 2.53 3.35 3.66 78.5 
Mean Change (%) - +7 -9 +28 +32 +9  
Median 1.38 1.36 1.25 1.38 1.60 1.63 18.4 
Median Change (%) - -2 -8 +10 +16 +2  
Minimum 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008  
Maximum 191 222 46 1,333 1,333 829  
   
Audit fees per £000 sales4   
Aggregate2 0.48 0.461 0.423 0.424 0.458 0.464 -3.3 
Mean3 4.62 5.06 11.45 16.74 20.48 8.29 79.4 
Mean Change (%) - +10 +126 +46 +22 -60  
Median 1.33 1.32 1.54 1.77 1.89 1.80 35.3 
Median Change (%) - 0 +17 +14 +7 -5  
Minimum 0.026 0.034 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.032  
Maximum 2,571 2,333 12,000 10,000 7,000 10,000  
Notes:  1.  Several companies did not report any sales during the year. 
 2.  Aggregate = (sum of all company audit fees)/(sum of all company total assets or sales). 
 3.  To avoid gross distortion by outliers, the 1% trimmed mean (0.5% from top and bottom) is reported. 
  4.  Companies without sales were excluded from analysis. 
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Table 3: Effect of client size on audit fee rate 
 
 
Panel A:  Mean audit fee per £000 total assets  
  Small                              Size decile                                       Large 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2001 10.74 4.40 3.05 2.02 1.87 1.34 1.21 0.81 0.50 0.29 
2002 17.07 4.77 3.48 2.23 2.22 1.67 1.22 0.89 0.54 0.31 
2003 27.42 5.25 3.51 2.54 2.26 1.67 1.28 0.97 0.57 0.33 
2003 vs. 2001 
t-stat1
 
2.91*** 
 
1.98** 
 
1.45 
 
2.96***
 
1.92 
 
2.28**
 
0.64 
 
1.85 
 
1.43 
 
1.37 
     
Panel A:  Median audit fee per £000 total assets 
  Small                              Size decile                                       Large 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2001 6.70 3.51 2.54 1.70 1.50 1.12 0.97 0.62 0.40 0.21 
2002 8.46 4.19 2.79 1.78 1.78 1.23 1.01 0.76 0.40 0.22 
2003 10.31 4.52 2.84 2.14 1.86 1.33 1.10 0.80 0.47 0.25 
2003 vs. 2001 
z-stat1,2
 
5.59*** 
 
2.38** 
 
1.69 
 
2.82***
 
1.57 
 
2.25** 
 
0.73 
 
1.71 
 
1.84 
 
1.87 
    
      1  ** = p< 5%, ***  = p< 1% (2-tail) 
  2   Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. 
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Table 4: Auditor concentration in the UK domestic listed company market: 1998 
to 2003 
 
 
Panel A:  Based on number of audits 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1998 vs. 2003
z- stat 2 
CR4 67.02 65.69 63.62 61.99 66.40 68.47 0.85 
CR (Big 5/4) 1 75.86 75.30 72.95 70.63 68.80 68.47    -4.51*** 
CR6 80.46 80.57 78.43 76.93 78.96 80.66 0.14 
CR20 94.65 95.79 95.54 95.39 95.12 94.81 0.20 
HI 14.36 13.81 12.78 12.13 12.63 13.32  
Gini (whole market) 87.88 87.50 86.50 86.48 86.12 86.19  
Gini (Big 5/4) 1 29.89 19.25 24.00 23.69 32.00 14.72  
       
Panel B: Based on audit fees 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1998 vs. 2003
z- stat 2
CR4 87.85 87.95 86.44 87.86 93.53 95.94 7.95*** 
CR (Big 5/4) 1 94.94 95.29 94.68 94.66 95.06 95.94 1.30 
CR6 96.00 96.56 96.15 96.16 96.41 97.85 2.89*** 
CR20 99.20 99.31 99.30 99.36 99.44 99.57 1.29 
HI 27.80 26.64 25.28 25.02 25.80 27.04  
Gini (whole market) 96.09 95.88 95.33 95.65 95.95 96.06  
Gini (Big 5/4) 1 47.88 44.17 41.09 42.13 46.00 29.73  
 
                   
Notes: 
1.  Big 5 up to 2002. Most Andersen clients (97 companies) changed auditor in 2002, however, there were 36 
companies’ still audited by Andersen in 2002. These companies were treated as Andersen clients until publication 
of the next annual report in 2003. 
2.  Standard test of difference between proportions;  *** = p< 1% (2-tail). Equivalent tests for HI and Gini 
unavailable. 
 
               
  
Table 5: Auditor market share (rank) by individual firm 
 
 Market share (rank) based on 
 No. of audits Audit fees 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003  1998   1999  2000  2001  2002 2003  
               %  %  %  %  % %  %   %  %  %  % %
PwC 26.32 (1) 24.97 (1) 22.45 (1) 21.44 (1) 20.57 (1) 20.85 (1) 43.43 (1) 42.71 (1) 40.57 (1) 39.23 (1) 37.72 (1) 40.01 (1)
KPMG 19.91 (2) 19.49 (2) 19.41 (2) 18.45 (2) 18.50 (2) 18.47 (2) 25.62 (2) 23.16 (2) 23.81 (2) 25.18 (2) 26.12 (2) 23.57 (2)
Deloitte & Touche 9.52 (4) 10.61 (3) 10.62 (4) 11.50 (3) 16.50 (3) 18.33 (3) 7.09 (5) 9.72 (4) 11.39 (3) 13.18 (3) 18.62 (3) 19.53 (3)
Ernst & Young 11.26 (3) 10.61 (3) 11.16 (3) 10.59 (4) 10.82 (4) 10.82 (4) 11.44 (3) 12.36 (3) 10.67 (4) 10.28 (4) 11.06 (4) 12.83 (4)
Andersen 8.84 (5) 9.61 (5) 9.33 (5) 8.64 (5) 2.40 (8)    -     - 7.37 (4) 7.34 (5) 8.24 (5) 6.80 (5) 1.53 (5)    -     - 
Total Big 5/4 75.86 75.30 72.95 70.63 68.80 68.47 94.94 95.29 94.68 94.66 95.06 95.94
     
BDO Stoy Hayward 4.60 (6) 5.27 (6) 5.34 (7) 6.24 (7) 6.08 (6) 5.84 (6) 1.06 (6) 1.28 (6) 1.47 (6) 1.50 (6) 1.35 (6) 1.02 (5)
Grant Thornton 4.48 (7) 4.61 (7) 5.48 (6) 6.30 (6) 6.48 (5) 6.35 (5) 0.88 (7) 0.88 (7) 1.13 (7) 1.22 (7) 1.12 (7) 0.90 (6)
Baker Tilly 1.00 (11) 1.13 (11) 1.69 (10) 1.56 (11) 3.61 (7) 4.18 (7) 0.18 (12) 0.18 (11) 0.23 (11) 0.20 (12) 0.49 (8) 0.53 (7)
Robson Rhodes 1.31 (9) 1.54 (9) 1.49 (11) 1.62 (10) 1.74 (9) 1.80 (9) 0.36 (10) 0.33 (8) 0.34 (8) 0.32 (9) 0.32 (9) 0.26 (8)
Pannell Kerr Forster 1.49 (8) 1.60 (8) 1.83 (8) 1.88 (8) 1.67 (10) 2.02 (8) 0.36 (9) 0.28 (9) 0.32 (9) 0.33 (8) 0.25 (11) 0.21 (9)
Moore Stephens 0.75 (13) 0.80 (12) 0.74 (13) 0.78 (13) 1.07 (11) 1.08 (10) 0.37 (8) 0.26 (10) 0.27 (10) 0.23 (11) 0.29 (10) 0.19 (10)
Others 10.52  9.75  10.48 10.98  10.55 10.25 1.84 1.51 1.56 1.54 1.12 0.96
Total Non-Big 5/4    24.14  24.70  27.05 29.37  31.20 31.53 5.06 4.71 5.32 5.34 4.94 4.06
                          
Total 100            100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total audit fees (£m)              405 401 397 415 450 470 
Number of companies             1,607 1,498 1,479 1,539 1,497 1,386       
 
Note:  Ordered on 2003 audit fee market share. 
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Table 6:  Analysis of Big 5/4 concentration movement: 1998-2003 
 
Panel A:  Based on number of audits 
  All UK 
Non- Big 5/4  
Number of audits (% of all UK) 
Big 5/4  
Number of audits (% of all UK)
 
Number of audits in 1998  1607  388 (24.1)  1219 (75.9)  
Leavers listed in 1998  (643)  (160) (24.9)  (483) (75.1)  
Continuing companies  964  228 (23.7)  736 (76.3)  
Companies joining LSE 1999-2003 541  262 (48.4)  279 (51.6)   
Leavers who joined after 1998 (119)  (57) (47.9)  (62) (52.1)   
Net joiners  422 205 (48.6)  217 (51.4)  
  1386 433 (31.2)  953 (68.8)  
Non-par switches:       
Auditor change to Big 5/4 1999-2003    (99)  99   
Auditor change from Big 5/4 1999-2003    103   (103)   
  _____  4   (4)   
Number of audits in 2003  1386  437 (31.5)  949 (68.5)  
        
Panel B:  Based on audit fees (£000) 
 All UK 
Non- Big 5/4 
Total audit fee (% of all UK) 
Big 5/4 
Total audit fee (% of all UK) 
 
Audit fees  in 1998   405,211   20,514 (5.1)   384,697 (94.9)  
Leavers listed in 1998  (116,897)   (10,154) (8.7)   (106,743) (91.3)  
Continuing companies’ audit fees at 1998    288,314   10,360 (3.6)   277,654 (96.3)  
Continuing companies’ audit fee changes   134,821     7,158 (5.3)   127,663 (94.7)  
Continuing companies’ audit fees at 2003   423,135   17,518 (4.1)   405,317 (95.8)  
Companies joining LSE 1999-2003 55,030   6,319 (11.5)   48,711  (88.5)   
Leavers who joined after 1998 (8,015)   (1,957) (24.4)   (6,058)  (75.6)   
Net joiners     47,015     4,362 (9.3)   42,653 (90.7)  
   470,150   21,880 (4.7)   447,970 (95.3)  
Non-par switches:           
Auditor change to Big 5/4 1999-2003     (9,357)    9,357    
Auditor change from Big 5 /4 1999-2003    6,532    (6,532)    
       (2,825)   2,825   
Audit fees  in 2003   470,150   19,055 (4.1)  451,095 (95.9)  
 
Notes: 1.  The number (£000) of auditor changes to Big 5/4 is as follows: 1999 = 26 (2,423); 2000 =22 (1,409); 2001=18 (1,934); 2002= 21 (1,795); 2003=12 (1,796). 
           2.  The number (£000) of auditor changes from Big 5/4 is as follows: 1999 = 17 (906); 2000 =9 (1,149); 2001=23 (1,128); 2002= 33 (1,603); 2003=21 (1,746). 
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Table 7: Auditor market share in 2003 (based on audit fees) by industry sector 
 
Sector Mkt Cap 
(£bn) 
No. of 
Cos 
PwC 
% 
KPMG
% 
DT 
% 
EY 
% 
Big 4
% 
BDO 
% 
GT
% 
BT 
% 
RR 
% 
PKF 
% 
MS
% 
Top-10
% 
Others
% 
Resources                
Mining 57,258 31 19.4 30.1 36.4 11.9 97.7 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 99.8 0.2 
Oil & Gas 243,152 31 92.0 0.1 1.6 5.0 98.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 99.7 0.3 
Basic Industries                
Chemicals 19,110 20 42.6 50.6 4.4 0.8 98.4 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 99.3 0.7 
Cons. & Build. Mat. 37,924 71 32.5 31.4 16.2 15.2 95.2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.5 97.7 2.3 
Forestry & Paper 1,563 3 4.9 95.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Steel & Oth. Metals 3,158 4 94.6 1.4 3.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.4 
General Industrials                
Aerospace & Defence 71,062 13 34.8 53.0 9.6 2.1 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.4 
Diversified Industrials 197,192 4 15.3 78.8 0.0 0.0 94.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.1 5.9 
Elect. & Elect’l Equip. 13,478 46 5.1 10.6 19.1 53.6 88.4 1.1 7.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0 98.2 1.8 
Engin. & Machinery 32,952 64 18.0 37.3 25.4 15.2 95.8 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 98.5 1.5 
Cyclical                 
Automobiles 41,041 20 77.3 10.6 4.7 2.5 95.1 1.3 3.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Housing Gds & Textiles 4,297 52 54.1 18.4 10.3 4.4 87.2 0.2 2.7 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.0 93.1 6.9 
Non-Cyclical                 
Beverages 64,621 9 27.3 60.9 0.0 10.4 98.7 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.1 
Food Prod. & Process. 43,481 30 57.1 17.2 21.6 2.7 98.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 99.6 0.4 
Health 34,224 41 45.0 18.5 27.0 4.1 94.6 0.0 1.0 1.3 2.2 0.2 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Person. Care & House.  15,526 3 0.0 14.0 81.9 0.0 95.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.9 4.1 
Pharma. & Biotech. 187,309 38 62.6 28.8 5.7 0.5 97.5 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Tobacco 94,614 3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Cyclical Services                
General Retailers 63,140 68 49.0 13.3 22.0 6.3 90.6 7.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 99.3 0.7 
Leisure & Hotels 30,927 88 20.3 20.9 15.6 32.0 88.8 4.9 1.6 2.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 98.1 1.9 
Media & Entertainment 62,865 99 35.7 6.1 41.3 11.7 94.8 0.7 1.1 2.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 99.3 0.7 
Support Services 38,866 149 36.2 25.6 17.1 16.7 95.6 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 99.1 0.9 
Transport 27,054 38 31.9 22.1 15.0 30.5 99.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 0.2 
Non-Cyclical Services                
Food & Drug Retailers 33,453 16 66.3 17.6 0.0 12.0 95.9 2.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Telecom. Services 163,225 19 24.2 39.3 35.2 0.8 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 99.7 0.3 
Utilities                
Electricity 14,995 6 55.8 37.3 0.0 5.3 98.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Utilities - Other 31,251 10 86.8 0.8 5.8 5.8 99.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 0.8 
Financials                
Banks 377,346 10 42.6 24.3 33.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Insurance 35,593 21 63.7 14.0 6.8 8.8 93.3 0.0 1.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 96.5 3.5 
Life Assurance 38,290 8 10.3 50.8 2.4 36.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Real Estate 26,178 76 23.7 24.7 37.4 2.9 88.8 3.4 1.4 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 95.9 4.1 
Speciality & Oth. Fin 54,951 125 28.1 11.5 24.7 29.0 93.2 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.1 97.8 2.2 
Info. Technology                
IT Hardware 6,210 28 13.7 6.6 18.5 53.4 92.2 1.6 0.3 2.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 99.5 0.5 
Soft. & Comp. Services 71,410 142 31.2 20.4 25.4 11.9 88.8 3.3 3.0 2.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 98.9 1.1 
Summary                
No. of sectors where:  
 market share ≥ 50% 
   
11 
 
6 
 
1 
 
2 
 
20 
        
 market leader   18 8 4 4 34         
 ≥ 50% & market leader   11 6 1 2 20         
Total cos. in 34 sectors  1,386              
Notes: 1.  Market shares of 50% or greater are highlighted in bold; leaders are underlined.  
   2.  PwC= PricewaterhouseCoopers; KPMG= KPMG; DT= Deloitte; EY= Ernst & Young; BDO= BDO Stoy Hayward; 
       GT= Grant Thornton; BT= Baker Tilly; RR= Robson Rhodes; PKF= PKF; MS= Moore Stephens. 
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Table 8: Analysis of former Andersen clients - successor auditors, audit and NAS fees  
 
 
Median Median Median
DT 2 93 74.4 19,471 20,449 5.0 0.93 1.04 7.2% 49,355 39,300 -20.4 68,826 59,749 -13.2
PWC 9 7.2 2,711 2,535 -6.5 1.08 1.34 -9.3 1,418 2,103 48.3 4,129 4,638 12.3
EY 6 4.8 3,818 4,264 11.7 0.87 0.86 6.3% 3,200 973 -69.6 7,018 5,237 -25.4
KPMG 6 4.8 1,211 1,062 -12.3 1.18 0.73 -23.9 2,063 2,544 23.3 3,274 3,606 10.1
B4 excl DT 21 16.8 7,740 7,861 1.6 0.99 0.94 -6.7 6,681 5,620 -15.9 14,421 13,481 -6.5
0.0 0.0 1.2
All B4 114 91.2 27,211 28,310 4.0 0.95 0.99 3.0 56,036 44,920 -19.8 83,247 73,230 -12.0
0.0 -15.1 -1.9
All non-B4 11 8.8 366 322 -12.0 2.31 2.35 1.7 399 211 -47.1 765 533 -30.3
-10.0 0.0 -28.4
All former AA clients 125 100 27,577 28,632 3.8 1.00 1.02 2.4 56,435 45,131 -20.0 84,012 73,763 -12.2
0.0 -13.2 -3.9
Notes:
1.  AA= Andersen; DT= Deloitte Touche; PWC= PricewaterhouseCoopers; EY= Ernst & Young; KPMG= KPMG; 
     non-B4 successor auditors are BDO Stoy Hayward (4); Robson Rhodes (3); Nexia Audit (2); Grant Thornton (1); and Wilkins Kennedy (1).
2.  For DT, the median change in audit fees, NAS and total fees were 0.0%, -17.1% and -6.6% respectively.
3.  This is the median across the 21, 114, 11, 125 former AA clients audited respectively by 'B4 excluding DT', B4, non-B4 and overall.
4.  This is the median % change in audit fee rate across the group of new auditor clients rather than the change in median audit fee rate.
Median change in fees 
across non-B4  3
Median change in fees 
across all AA clients 3
Median change in fees 
across B4  3
Panel A
Median change in fees 
across B4 excl DT  3
 % Change
Panel B Panel D Panel E
Aggregate AUDIT fees (£000)
Successor 1 No. of audits % AA New auditor  % Change New auditor % Change 4  % Change
Audit fees per £000 total assets
Panel C
Aggregate TOTAL fees (£000)Aggregate NAS fees (£000)
AA New auditorAA AA New auditor
 
 
         
Figure 1: Effects of client size on audit fee rate 
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Note: 1. Audit fee rate = £audit fee per £000 total assets audited 
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